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ABSTRACT
In recent trends, the mechanism of coping, a psychologi-
cal mechanism that consists of expending conscious effort
to respond to the significance of events, is incorporated in
Affective Intelligent Agents to deal with negative situations,
usually signaled by strong negative emotions. In this paper,
we propose to adopt Roseman’s coping theory to model emo-
tional coping in an intelligent agent that appraises situations
based on its goals and values. In particular, coping strate-
gies for negative moral emotions affect the moral dimension
of the agent.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.m [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE]: Miscellaneous;
I.2.1 [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE]: Knowledge Rep-
resentation Formalisms and Methods
General Terms
Languages, Theory
Keywords
Emotions; Affective Agents; Virtual Agents; Coping
1. INTRODUCTION
Given their importance for human behavior, emotions have
attracted the attention of scholars who attempt to create
models of intelligent agents, as surveyed by [4, 6]. A funda-
mental contribution of emotions to human behavior is given
by the mechanism of coping [5, 3], intended as a set of strate-
gies that people put to use to deal with stressful situations,
usually signaled by negative emotions such as fear or shame.
Given their usefulness, coping mechanisms have been inte-
grated into computational models of emotions [6, 4]. Coping
allows agents to deal with strong negative emotions by ma-
nipulating their cognitive states in a way that changes their
appraisal of the situation and affects their behavior.
In recent years, coping strategies have been integrated into
computational models of emotions with methodologies that
range from agent modeling [6, 4] to logic formalization [1].
Appears in: Proceedings of the 14th International Confer-
ence on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AA-
MAS 2015), Bordini, Elkind, Weiss, Yolum (eds.), May,
4–8, 2015, Istanbul, Turkey.
Copyright c© 2015, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
Most computational models follow Lazarus’s theory [5] of
coping and the taxonomy of coping strategies proposed by
Carver et al. [3]. Broadly speaking, coping is encoded into
intelligent agents as a process that affects the agent’s in-
terpretation of the situation by manipulating its beliefs and
goals (e.g., changing the importance of goals [6, 4, 1] and
its expectations about the outcomes of actions [6], drop-
ping intentions [6, 4]). In this paper, we propose a coping
mechanism for moral emotions based on Roseman’s coping
theory [8] and we integrate it in a moral emotional agent
model [2]. Differently from previous theories, Roseman’s
theory specifies coping strategies that are specific to nega-
tive moral emotions and affect the agent’s moral dimension
and behavior through the notion of emotivational goals. Our
coping mechanism affects not only goals but also the moral
values of the agent, changing their importance or motivating
the agent’s will of being compliant with its moral values via
emotion-specific emotivational goals.
2. THE COPING MODEL
As anticipated in the previous section, we deal with the
coping of events that negatively affect the agent’s goals and
values (i.e., Distress, Fear, Shame, Reproach, Remorse and
Anger), i.e., they are are “motive inconsistent” in Rose-
man’s terms. These emotions include both primitive moral
emotions (Shame and Reproach), rooted in value compli-
ance, and goal-based emotions (Fear and Distress), needed
to model compound emotions (Remorse and Anger). Fig. 1
summarizes the strategies that we implemented for the fol-
lowing emotions: Fear, Distress, Shame, Reproach, Anger
and Remorse. All strategies are related to taking distance
from the negative stimulus. Fear and Distress motivate the
agent to take distance from its own goals and plans that have
caused the negative emotions, while moral emotions (Shame,
Remorse, Reproach, Anger) are characterized by taking dis-
tance from one’ s own moral values that have caused the
negative emotions.
Distress: an agent feels Distress when one of its goals
has failed, so it reduces the importance of the failed goal gi
(i.e., it takes distance from the goal) in order to decrease
the intensity of the negative emotion and the probability of
selecting the goal during the next deliberation phase.
Fear: the agent feels Fear when its current plan pit has
a low probability of success. If this is the case, continuing
executing the plan would be a waste of energy and time, so
“taking distance” from the stimulus is realized by dropping
the plan.
Emotions( Coping((activation(conditions( Coping((effects(
Distress( An#agent’s#goal#has#failed# Lower#the#desire#importance#of#failure#
Fear( The#current#plan#has#a#low#probability#of#success# Drop#the#plan#
Shame(
Self<caused:#the#active#plan#puts#at#stake#a#value#vi# Lower#the#value##priority,#continue#performing#the#current#plan.#
Ignore#the#threat#to#the#moral#dimension#
Reproach(( Other<caused:#a#value#is#put#at#stake#by#an#action#performed#by#another#agenti#
Create#goal#increaseSocialDistance(agenti)!
Anger( A#value#vi#is#at#stake#and#one#of#adopted##goal#gj#is#unachievable#
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Figure 1: Coping strategies implemented for negative moral emotions, inspired by Roseman’s theory.
Shame: when the agent performs an action that puts at
stake one of its values, the agent feels Shame. The cop-
ing strategy of Shame consists in taking distance from its
moral dimension, so that the agent lowers the importance of
the value at stake vi in order to reduce the intensity of the
negative emotion.
Reproach: when an agent’s value vi is at stake (and the
responsibility is attributed to another agent’s action), the
agent feels Reproach toward the agent ax who performed
the blameworthy action. According to Roseman [8], the
agent takes distance from the agent who performed blame-
worthy actions by lowering its contact with it. Differently
from other coping strategies, this strategy is inherently so-
cial, since it affects the relation between self and other. So,
we model this coping strategy through the goal of increasing
social distance (increaseSocialDistance(ax, vi)) from the
agent who performed the blameworthy action (thus putting
the value at stake). This goal motivates actions that aim to
signal the non-compliance with value.
Anger: when another agent performs an action that causes
the failure of an agent’s adopted goal gj and puts an agent’s
value vi at stake, the agent feels Anger. In response to
Anger, the agent forms the goal (increaseSocialDistance(ax,-
vi), reEstablish(gj)). The adoption condition of the goal of
asserting blame is the conjunction of two conditions, i.e.
that the agent ax performed the blameworthy action and
that the value vi is at stake as the consequence of this ac-
tion.
Remorse: when an agent performs an action that causes
the failure of one of its own adopted goal gj and puts one of
its own values vi at stake, the agent feels Remorse. So, the
agent creates the goals (reEstablish(vi), reEstablish(gj))
with the aim of bringing the value at stake back to balance
and re-establishing the conditions for adopting the failed
goal.
3. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this proposal, we sketched a computational model of
emotion-focused coping for moral emotions inspired by Rose-
man’s theory of coping. In our proposal, Roseman’s coping
strategies are translated into rules that affect the mental
state of the artificial agent, by modifying its goals and val-
ues, or asserting new moral goals when the inconsistency
cannot be solved by a simple manipulation of the agent’s
motivational and moral components. The current model has
some important limitations and needs to be improved and
extended: for example it does not take into account the in-
teraction of coping with the social relations of the agent. An
integration of the model presented in [7], where the authors
present a formal model of social relations, may help solving
this problem. A social component would also be beneficial
to modulate the role of values on their shared priority.
As future work, we envisage the implementation of the
model in an practical agent architecture and its evaluation
of a wider range of scenarios. The implementation in an
agent architecture should deal with the balance between the
modification of goals and values implied by coping and the
stability of agent’s behavior implied by the persistence of
intentions.
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